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Dorf: "Use" and the Irresistible Impulse

"USE" AND THE IRRESISTIBLE IMPULSE' TO
LEGISLATE
Robert C. Dorf, Esq.*

INTRODUCTION

No, Mr. Bumble, the law is not "a ass, a idiot," 2 but it does seem that
meaning what is said and saying what a statute's plain language means
* Please note that the Supreme Court decision in Bailey v. United States, 1995
WL 712269, was handed down on December 6, 1995. Consequently, this article was not
able to include the decision in the text; however, the author is pleased to note that he
correctly predicted not only the outcome of the Supreme Court's decision, but also the
unanimous nature of it.
Robert C. Doff is the principal law clerk to Hon. James G. Starkey of the New York
State Supreme Court, Criminal Term, Brooklyn, New York. Prior to this position, Mr.
Dorf worked in private practice for many years. He received his J.D. from Brooklyn Law
School in 1972.
Mr. Dorf s litigation experience includes practice in the courts of the State of New
York, various federal district courts, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit and applications to the Supreme Court of the United States.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect those of
his office.
The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Stephen A. Malito, Research
Editor, Touro Law Review, Touro Law School class of 1996 in preparing this article.
1. ROBERT TRAVER, ANATOMY OF A MtmnER 418 (St. Martin's Press 1958). In this
novel, the judge instructed the jury concerning expert testimony offered on behalf of the
defendant concerning a type of insanity knowr as "irresistible impulse" as follows:
I charge you that such a form of insanity is recognized as a defense to crime in
Michigan and that it is the law of this state that even if the defendant had been
able to comprehend the nature and consequences of his act, and to know that it
was wrong, that nevertheless if he was forced to its execution by an irresistible
impulse which he was powerless to control in consequence of a temporary or
permanent disease of the mind, then he was insane and you should acquit him.
Id
2. See United States v. Bailey, 995 F.2d 1113, 1119 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (Ginsburg.

J., dissenting) (referring to a character in the novel by

CHARLES DICONS, OLIVER TWIST

520 (Dodd, Mead & Co. 1941) (1838)). In his dissent, Judge Ginsburg found the majority's affirmance of the defendant's conviction for "use" of a hand gun under 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c) to be irreconcilable with previous D.C. Circuit decisions in United States v.
Derr, 990 F.2d 1330 (1993), and United States v. Bruce, 939 F.2d 1053 (1991). Id.
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). See infra note 5. In each case, the Court of Appeals reversed
the lower court's conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) because the lower court failed to
establish the second prong of the two-part test which the D.C. Circuit had sculpted to
determine whether a defendant has "used" a gun "during and in relation to" the drug
trafficking crime under § 924(c). See Derr, 990 F.2d at 1338; Bruce, 939 F.2d at 1056.
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approaches the realm of virtual impossibility when courts interpret the
word "use" with regard to firearms.
The purpose of this article is to discuss the loss of what I describe as
the "possession-use distinction." In view of Justice (then, Chief Judge of
the First Circuit Court of Appeals) Stephen Breyer's expressed disap-

proval of the judicial dissolution of the distinction between "possession"
and "use," 3 perhaps the federal and New York State courts will rethink

their interpretations of the relevant statutes. Likewise, it is possible that
both Congress and the New York legislature will amend the statutes in
question to punish both "use" and "possession" at the same level.

As one who has long toiled in the vineyards of the criminal law in
both the New York State courts and in the federal system, I have often
been nonplused (from the technician's point of view) regarding firearms
case law. My confusion exists in spite of sensitivity to the understandable human and judicial impulse to treat criminal possession and use of
weapons equally severely because of the death and destruction that both
the guns and the defendants have caused. Nevertheless, it is impossible
to applaud judicial hammering of statutory "possession" into "use"
which is contrary to legislative intent.

In his dissent in United States v. Bailey,4 Judge Stephen F. Williams
stated that the majority's interpretation of the word "use" as it relates to

18 U.S.C. § 924(c) 5 gives rise to an "ultimate result... that possession
The test requires the government to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) there is
a nexus between the defendant and the gun (which can be satisfied by showing actual or
constructive possession by defendant), and (2) the gun was "used" to facilitate the predicate offense. Bailey, 995 F.2d at 116; Derr, 990 F.2d at 1337. Judge Ginsburg questioned the propriety of the Derr and Bruce decisions as well as the constitutionality of
the two-part test. See Bailey, 995 F.2d at 1119-21 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Essentially,
Judge Ginsburg's argument is that "§ 924(c) reaches the use of a firearm 'in relation to
any ...drug trafficking crime,"' rather than merely a predicate crime charged so that the
"'related' drug trafficking crime need not have been charged so long as all of its elements
are proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 1121 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting 18
U.S.C. § 924(c)). These "bumblings" in the D.C. Circuit, according to Judge Ginsburg,
gave rise to his statement that "[s]ometimes the law is 'a ass, a idiot,' Mr. Bumble." Id at
1119 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
3. See United States v. McFadden, 13 F.3d 463, 466-70 (1st Cir. 1994) (Breyer,
C.J., dissenting) (arguing that wide variance in case law has made it necessary to draw
the line between simple possession and use of a gun so that possession of a gun in relation to a drug crime does not automaticallyconnote use).
4. 36 F.3d 106 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 1689 (1995). This case
constitutes a rehearing of two cases and will later be referred to as Robinson #2 in this
text. See supra notes 11 and 20-24.
5. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1984). Section 924(c)(1) provides, in pertinent part:
"Whoever, during and in relation to any ...drug trafficking crime.., uses or carries a
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amounts to 'use.'

6

In United States v. McFadden,7 then Chief Judge

Breyer stated, in dissent to the majority's definition of "use" in relation
to firearm possession, that "in my view, prior cases, and likely congressional intent, indicate that the word 'use,' in this particular statute, car-

ries a more active meaning - a meaning that excludes simple. .. possession."8
Statutorily speaking, both 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) 9 and New York Penal
Law § 265.0310 punish "use of a firearm," as distinguished from simple
or mere possession, with enhanced penalties.

By means of linguistic manipulation and strained statutory interpretation, the New York and federal courts have blurred or dissolved the dis-

tinction between possession and use of a firearm. That loss or blurring of
the "possession-use distinction" may seem subtle to the casual reader,
however, the resulting sentencing enhancements verge on the draconian.11 The view set forth herein is that both Congress and the New
York State legislature never intended to blur the "possession-use dis-

tinction." The loss of that important distinction appears to be a case law
distortion that is a creation of the judiciary.

firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such... drug trafficking crime,
be sentenced to imprisonment for five years." Id.
6. See United States v. Bailey, 36 F.3d at 120-24 (Williams, J., dissenting)
(arguing that a more active definition of the word "use" should be substituted for the
majority's broad definition and that the new "proximity" and "accessibility" test virtually
guarantees a conviction under § 924(c) where guns and drugs are involved); infra notes
11-12 and accompanying text.
7. 13 F.3d 463 (Ist Cir. 1994).
8. Id at 467 (Breyer, C.L, dissenting).
9. See supra note 5.
10. N.Y. PENAL LA~v § 265.03 (McKinney 1995). Section 265.03 states: "A person
is guilty of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree when he possesses a
machine-gun or loaded firearm with intent to use the same unlawfully against another."
IR Criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree is a Class "C" felony: the penalty is a maximum of 15 years. Id. See N.Y. PENAL LA\v § 70.02(1)(b) (MeKinney 1995):
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.00(2)(c) (McKinney 1995). Criminal possession of a weapon in
the third degree, simple possession, is a Class "D" felony; the penalty is a maximum of
seven years. N.Y. PENAL LANV § 265.02(4), (5) (McKinney 1995). See N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 70.02(1)(c) (McKinney 1995); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 70.00(2)(d) (McKinney 1995).
11. McFadden, 13 F.3d at 467 (Breyer, C.I., dissenting). "Let me be more specific.
The special 'mandatory minimum' sentencing statute says that anyone who 'uses or carries' a gun 'during and in relation to any... drug trafficking crime' must receive a mandatory five-year prison term added on to his drug crime sentence." Id. (Breyer, CJ.. dissenting) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)). See supra notes 5 and 10.
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A. FEDERAL FIREARMS LAW
The concerns of the courts and the basis of "the irresistible impulse"
to legislate and expand the definition of "use" are nowhere more clearly
and candidly stated than by Judge Ginsburg in his majority opinion in
United States v. Bailey, 12 wherein the court states that "use"
could be defined either narrowly, so as to encompass only the paradigmatic uses of a gun, i.e., firing, brandishing, or displaying the gun during
the commission of the predicate offense, or more broadly, so as to include the other ways in which a gun can be used to facilitate drug trafficking. The narrow definition has the virtue of simplicity; it is, after all,
relatively easy to determine whether the defendant's firing, brandishing,
or displaying a gun was related to the defendant's... drug trafficking offense. The narrow definition also has the vice of simplicity, however; it
is too narrow to capture all of the various uses of a firearm that the Congress apparently intended to reach via § 924(c)(1). 13
Without stating a basis for his belief as to Congress' apparent intention, Judge Ginsburg describes what amounts to an almost metaphysical
definition of the term "use" as follows: "A gun can surely be used even
when it is not being handled, however. For example a gun placed in a
drawer beside one's bed for fear of an intruder would, in common parlance, be a gun 'used' for domestic protection."1 4 In Judge Ginsburg's
court, "use" seems to be whatever the court says it is.
Difficulty defining "use" is not limited to the Bailey court. In Smith v.
United States, 15 a six to three decision, the Supreme Court of the United
States vigorously debated whether § 924(c) "use" included bartering or
trading a firearm in exchange for cocaine (the majority view), 16 or that
"use" was limited to the classic paradigmatic definition (the dissenting
view). 17 A distinguishing feature of Smith, however, may be that peti12. 36 F.3d at 114. United States v. Bailey was an en banc rehearing of the appeals
of defendants Bailey, supra note 2, and Robinson, infra note 21. The D.C. Circuit affirmed both convictions, and threw out its two-pronged, open-ended test. Bailey, 36 F.3d
at 118. See supra note 2 for discussion of the old test. The new test promulgated by the

court established that a finding that the firearm was (1) accessible and (2) proximate to
the defendant during the commission of a drug trafficking offense will affirm a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Id. at 108.

13. Id. at 114.
14. Id.

15. 113 S. Ct. 2050, 2052 (1993) (holding that trading a gun for narcotics constituted "use" within the meaning of § 924(c)).
16. Id.

17. Id at 2060-61 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Justice Scalia wryly noted
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tioner not only verbally offered the weapon for sale, he also pulled it out
of a bag and displayed or brandished it to the undercover police officer. 18 This, arguably, may constitute a paradigmatic use of the firearm.
The depth of the statutory construction quagmire is exemplified by a
long judicial reach into a dusty comer. In an effort to expand the meaning of "use" to include virtually all forms of possession, the Supreme
Court, in Smith, and the D.C. Circuit, in Bailey, cite an 1884 customs
case in which the Supreme Court found garments to be "in use" even
though they had not been worn. 19 It is worth noting that the Smith court
did not address firearm possession in terms of §924(c) when the firearm
is simply secreted somewhere in a residence and the sole relevance of
the weapon to the drug transaction is the practical assumption that the
drugs and the gun are connected.
The problem appears to be that when "use" goes from the narrow
definition (which I contend Congress intended) to an open-ended definition, that open approach produces widely divergent and seemingly contradictory results. 20
The case of United States v. Robinson21 [hereinafter Robinson #1]
epitomizes this difficulty. In Robinson #1, the police made a buy of
crack-cocaine in the defendant's apartment and after arrest, an unloaded
.22 caliber Derringer was found in defendant's locked trunk - a trunk
located in a bedroom closet. 22 The Robinson #1 court held there was no
"use" based upon the notion that the gun was not sufficiently available

[i]t would, indeed, be "both reasonable and normal to say that petitioner 'used'

his MAC-10 in his drug trafficking offense by trading it for cocaine." [citation
omitted] It would also be reasonable and normal to say that he "used" it to scratch
his head.... It is unquestionably not reasonable and normal, I think, to say sim-

ply "do not use firearms" when one means to prohibit selling or scratching with
them.
Id (Scalia, J., dissenting).
18. Id at 2052.
19. Id at 2054 (citing Astor v. Merritt, 11 U.S. 202 (holding that new articles of
clothing are chargeable with duty in contemplation of their future use despite the fact that

the clothes were not for sale)); United States v. Bailey, 36 F.3d 106, 108 (D.C. Cir.
1994). The Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit used Astor to demonstrate how the
broader, more inclusive definition of "use" has long been established in Supreme Court
jurisprudence. 113 S. Ct. at 2054; Bailey, 36 F.3d at 108.
20. See United States v. Bailey, 36 F.3d at 11l (referring to the court's opinions in

United States v. Derr, 990 F.2d 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1993), United States v. Morris, 977 F.2d
617 (D.C. Cir. 1992), and United States v. Bruce, 939 F.2d 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1991)): supra note 2 for discussion.
21. 997 F.2d 884 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (finding no evidence of actual use).
22. Id at 884.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1995

5

Touro Law Review, Vol. 12, No. 1 [1995], Art. 4

TOURO LA W REVIEW

[Vol 12

to be a risk for firing or brandishing.2 3 Thereafter, the court, sitting en
banc in United States v. Bailey [hereinafter Robinson #2], held that
Robinson did "use" the gun. 24 A majority of the court stated that
[i]n the context of § 924(c)(1), therefore, we hold that one uses a gun,
i.e., avails oneself of a gun, and therefore violates the statute, whenever
one puts or keeps the gun in a particular place from which one (or one's
agent) can gain access to it if and when needed to facilitate a drug
crime. 2 5
In his dissent in United States v. McFadden, Justice Breyer attempted,
with some futility, to rationalize the federal case law regarding "use"
and § 924(c) by citing Robinson # 1.26 He stated that in Robinson #1,
"the D.C. Circuit refused to permit a 'used for protection' inference
where a defendant kept an unloaded pistol and drugs in a locked footlocker in a closet (the footlocker, in contrast with [United States v.]
Wilkinson, 27 apparently was not 'carried' from place to place.)" 2 8 Subsequent to Justice Breyer's dissent in United States v. McFadden, Robinson #1 was reversed in Robinson # 2.29
Thereafter, on April 17, 1995, the Supreme Court granted Bailey and
Robinson's petitions for writs of certiorari. 3 0 The cases have been consolidated before the Supreme Court of the United States for the 1995-96
term. 3 1
Returning to United States v. McFadden, Justice Breyer's difficulty
with the majority's construction of "use" as defined in § 924(c) was that
the defendant never used the unloaded shotgun hidden under his mattress.32 "Use" of the unloaded shotgun was remote because the $40/two

23. Id. at 888 (noting that it was highly unlikely there was an "intention" to use a
gun which was found "unloaded, locked away, and without ammunition anywhere on the
premises").
24. 36 F.3d at 114 (recognizing the more inclusive understanding of "use" where a
gun can be used "even when it is not being handled").
25. Id. at 115.

26. 13 F.3d 463, 470 (Ist Cir. 1994) (Breyer, C.J., dissenting).
27. 926 F.2d 22 (1st Cir.) (guns in duffel bag with cocaine), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct.
2813 (1991).
28. McFadden, 13 F.3d at 470 (Breyer, C.J., dissenting) (citing United States v.
Robinson, 997 F.2d 884, 887-88 (D.C. Cir. 1993)).
29. Bailey, 36 F.3d at 118 (holding that a conviction under § 924(c)(1) will be affirmed when there is evidence of the gun's proximity and accessibility). See supra note
12.
30. Bailey v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 1689 (1995).
31. Id.

32. McFadden, 13 F.3d at 469 (Breyer, C.J., dissenting) (stating that the drug offender's possession of the gun did not rise to the level of a "use").
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gram cocaine drug transaction took place downstairs in the foyer of defendant's apartment building.33 The majority in McFadden noted that
the First Circuit had previously held that "mere presence of arms for the
protection of drugs for sale is present use." 34 Furthermore, the court
noted that it had previously found "use" based on "simple presence for
35
protection, the maintenance of a 'fortress.'"
In reversing the trial court's directed verdict of acquittal as to possession with intent to use, the McFadden majority announced that it was not
necessarily fond of the inflexible nature of § 924(c).36 The court, however, while agreeing with the dissent in its desire for more flexible Sentencing Guidelines, saw "no give, and no surrender, in this monolith of a
statute, on the books for many years and not disturbed when the Guidelines were enacted." 37 Furthermore, the majority suggested that the
United States Attorney's judgment in applying § 924(c) to such a smalltime defendant was questionable. 3 8 The majority, nevertheless, explained that, while the defendant's crimes did not necessarily rise to the
level of those found in a case such as Wilkinson or Hadfield, the
"difference [was] in degree, not in kind," and that "[t]he statute does not
measure the crime." 39 Quoting Wilkinson, the McFadden court stated
that "'ultimately, whether or not the gunoi helped appellant commit the
drug crime is a matter for a jury, applying common-sense theories of
human nature and causation.'" 40 Pursuant to § 924(c), defendant re41
ceived a five year incarceration enhancement.
Surely, converting McFadden's possession into "use" was a linguistic
and metaphysical feat as well as a statutory expansion that seems to have
33. l at465.

34. I at 465 (citing United States v. Wilkinson, 929 F.2d 22 (1st Cir.) (carrying
guns and drugs in bag to another's house), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1211 (1991)).

35. Id. at 465 (citing United States v. Hadfield, 918 F.2d 987 (Ist Cir. 1990) (guns
on the drug premises), cert. denied, I 11 S. Ct. 2062 (1991)).
36. Id at466.
37. IdR
38. Id To the misadventure of the defendant, however, the court stated that -lilt can
not be for the court to control the U.S. Attorney's use of this truly fortress of a statute: a
defendant's only hope is the U.S. Attorney's judgment, and the jury. Here he failed." Id.
39. Id The court added:
Moreover, how does one measure for this? And in what way do our differing
facts, on a case by case basis, indicate that we are taking a new approach? Only
one gun? Possible lack of title? No ammunition? Under our cases none of these
failures is fatal. The reasonfor this is that the difference betwieen mere possession
and use is in the mind of the user.
d (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
40. Id. (quoting United States v. Wilkinson, 929 F.2d at 26).
41. Id at 464. See ISU.S.C. § 924(c)(1). supra note 5.
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misplaced Congressional intent; McFadden's weapon secreted in his
room was inaccessible for the drug sale. As Justice Breyer stated: "As I
read the case law, when courts have held that 'use' encompasses
'possession,' they have always found (1) possession, (2) in connection
with a drug crime, and (3) something more."4 2 What, however, is
43
"something more?"
In United States v. Payero,44 "something more" was the common
sense notion that the firearm gave the defendant courage by allowing
him to protect himself.4 5 In United States v. Bruce,4 6 "something more"
was the mere presence of the firearm. 4 7 In contrast to the Payero court,
Judge Williams, in his dissent in Robinson # 2,48 argued that mere pres49
ence for protection or courage is the virtual opposite of "use."

In the Second Circuit, "something more" is, in actuality, the number
and accessibility of the firearms defendant possessed.50 Citing United
States v. Meggett5 ' in his dissenting opinion in Robinson #2, Judge Wil-

liams stated that "[w]hile the majority attempts to fine-tune the concept
of facilitation (and thereby, use) through its twin guideposts of proximity and accessibility, the ultimate result is that possession amounts to
'use' because possession enhances the defendant's confidence." 5 2 Judge
Williams added that "[h]ad Congress intended that, all it need have
mentioned is possession."53
Finally, it should be noted that Judge Williams, in clear and comprehensible language, explained that the "carry" provision of § 924(c)(1)
42. Id. at 468 (Breyer, C.J., dissenting).
43. Id. (Breyer, C.J., dissenting).
44. 888 F.2d 928 (lst Cir. 1989).
45. Id. at 929 (holding that a conviction will be sustained if the weapon facilitated
the transaction by "lending courage to the possessor").
46. 939 F.2d 1053, 1056 (presence of a Derringer and ammunition in a bag next to
the cache of drugs is not sufficient proof of "use" within the meaning of the statute),
47. Id at 1054.
48. 36 F.3d 106, 119-26 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Williams, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 122-23 (Williams, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority's broad definition of "use" has largely removed significance of the "carry" provision of § 924(c)).
50. See United States v. Meggett, 875 F.2d 24, 28-29 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that
possession of five firearms and large quantity of ammunition secreted about defendant's
apartment constituted "use" because weapons were an "integral part of the felony"). This
case, when compared with the majority in McFadden, is indicative of the confusion
which divergent application and interpretation of § 924(c) has engendered in the federal
system. See id; supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
51. 875 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1989).
52. Bailey, 36 F.3d at 124 (Williams, J., dissenting) (citing United States v.
McFadden, 13 F.3d at 466).
53. Id. at 125 (Williams, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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would apply to Bailey who was arrested with his gun in the trunk of his
car and his drugs in both the front and trunk of the car.54 The "use" provision of the statute, of course, would not apply to him.
B. NEW YORK FIREARMS LAW
In order to understand the New York courts' "legislative" approach to
blurring the "possession-use distinction," an understanding of New
York's statutory history is indispensable. By the year 1915, New York
Penal Law Section 1897 stated:
A person who attempts to use against another, or who carries, or possess,
any instrument or weapon of the kind commonly known as a black-jack,
slungshot [sic], billy, sandclub, sandbag, metal knuckles, bludgeon, or
who, with intent to use the same unlawfiully against another, carries or
possesses a dagger, dirk, dangerous knife, razor, stiletto, or any other
dangerous or deadly instrument or weapon is guilty of a misdemeanor,
and if he has been previously convicted of any crime he is guilty of a felony. 55
Section 1898 stated as follows:
The possession, by any person other than a public officer, of any of the
weapons specified in section eighteen hundred and ninety-seven or
eighteen hundred and ninety-seven-a of this chapter, concealed or furtively carried on the person, is presumptive [sic] evidence of carrying, or
concealing, or possessing, with intent to use the same in violation of this
article. 5 6
By 1965, the last year the old Penal Law was in effect, the statute in
question had been little changed. Section 1897(9) stated as follows:
Any person who has in his possession any dagger, dangerous knife, dirk,
razor, stiletto, imitation pistol or any other dangerous or deadly instrument or weapon with intent to use the same unlawfidly againstanother is
guilty of a misdemeanor, and he is guilty of a felony if he has previously
7
been convicted of any crime. 5
Furthermore, section 1899(4) stated in pertinent part:
The possession by any person of any dagger, dirk, stiletto, dangerous
knife or of any other weapon, instrument, appliance or substance de54. l (Williams, J., dissenting) (finding that a gun may be -carried" if it is on the
person of"a confederate and within easy reach of the defendant") (citation omitted).
55. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1897 (McKinney 1917) (bold in original) (emphasis added).
56. N.Y. PENALLAw § 1898 (lcKinney 1917) (bold in original) (emphasis added).
57. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1897(9) (McKinney 1965) (originally enacted in N.Y.
PENAL LAw of 1909) (emphasis added).
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signed, made or adapted for use primarily as a weapon, is presumptive
58
evidence of intent to use the same unlawfidly againstanother.
Moving from 1965 to the present penal law, Penal Law Section
265.01(2), criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree reads as
follows:
A person is guilty of criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree when: ...(2) He possesses any dagger, dangerous knife, dirk, razor,

stiletto, imitation pistol, or any other dangerous or deadly instrument or
weapon

with

intent to

use the same unlawfidly against an-

other.... Criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree is a class
A misdemeanor. 59
During the same period, 1965 to present, Penal Law Section
265.15(4), referred to as the statutory presumption of use, stated in pertinent part: "The possession by any person of any dagger, dirk, stiletto,
dangerous knife or any other weapon, instrument, appliance or substance
designed, made or adapted for use primarily as a weapon, is presumptive
evidence of intent to use the same unlawfully againstanother." 60
On September 1, 1974, Penal Law Section 265.03, criminal possession
of a weapon in the second degree, became effective. 6 1 That statute
states: "A person is guilty of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree when he possesses a machine-gun or loaded firearm with
intent to use the same unlawfully againstanother." 62
Significantly, the presumptive language of section 265.15(4) does not
mention or refer to the word "firearm." 63 If the effective dates of the
statutes are considered, it is clear that in writing the phrase "with intent
to use unlawfully against another" prior to 1965, the New York legislature did not intend the presumption under section 265.15(4) to apply to
64
section 265.03, criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree.
Rather, the legislature, through the use of identical language in section
265.15(4) ("intent to use the same unlawfully against another"), meant
to apply that presumption solely to section 265.01(2), criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree, which is a Class "A" misde-

58. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1899(4) (McKinney 1965) (originally enacted in N.Y.
PENAL LAW of 1909) (emphasis added).
59. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.01(2) (McKinney 1995) (emphasis added).
60. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.15(4) (McKinney 1995) (emphasis added).
61. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.03 (McKinney 1995) (emphasis added).
62. Id.
63. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.15(4), supra note 60 and accompanying text.
64. N.Y. PENAL LAW §265.03 (originally enacted as Act of September 1, 1974,
L.1974, c. 1041, § 12).
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meanor. 6 5 This is so because the section 265.15(4) presumption, and the

long history of that presumption, make clear that it is meant to be used
in conjunction with the particular misdemeanor weapons listed in section 265.01(2), as well as "generic" weapons made by adaptation of ordinary objects, such as a pencil or a pen, for use as a weapon. 6 6 The pre-

sumption's phrase "with intent to use the same unlawfully against the
person or property of another" 6 7 clearly applies to the following weapons or objects listed in section 265.01(2): "dagger, dangerous knife, dirk,

razor, stiletto, imitation pistol, or any other dangerous or deadly instrument or weapon." 68 Section 265.01(2) makes these weapons illegal

when they are used against another unlawfully and intentionally. 69 In
contrast, section 265.01(1) mentions "firearm" among others, and makes

the weapons listed in that subdivision per se illegal, the intent to use unlawfully against another not being required. 70 As such, the presumption
statute does not apply to firearms.

Furthermore, the section 265.15(4) presumption has been applied only
to misdemeanors since the turn of the century. 7 1 It is clear that the legislature did not intend that presumption to apply to criminal possession

of a weapon in the second degree, a Class "C"felony with a fifteen year
maximum. Nor did the legislature intend that simple or mere possession
of a firearm, proscribed in section 265.02(4),72 a Class "D" felony with
65. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.01(2), supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
66. See N.Y. PENAL LAV § 265.15(4), supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
67. See N.Y. PENAL LAWv § 265.15(4), supra note 60 and accompanying text.
68. See N.Y. PENAL LAXv § 265.01(2), supra note 59 and accompanying text.
69. See id, supra note 59 and accompanying text.
70. N.Y. PENAL LAWV § 265.01(1) (McKinney 1995). Section 265.01(1) provides:
A person is guilty of criminal possession of a weapon in the fotfrth degree %%hen:
(1) He possesses any firearm, electronic dart gun, electronic stun gun, gravity
knife, switchblade knife, pilum ballistic knife, cane sword, billy, blackjack.
bludgeon, metal knuckles, chuka stick, sand bag, sandclub, wristbrace type slingshot or slungshot, shirken or "Kung Fu Star"....
lId
71. See infranotes 73-74 and accompanying text.
72. N.Y. PENAL LAv § 265.02 (McKinney 1995). Section 265.02 provides:
A person is guilty of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree w'hen:
(1) He commits the crime of criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree
as defined in subdivision one, two, three or five of section 265.01, and has been
previously convicted of any crime; or (2) He possesses any explosive or incendiary bomb, bombshell, firearm silencer, machine-gun or any other firearm or
weapon simulating a machine-gun and which is adaptable for such use; or (3) He
knowingly has in his possession a machine-gun, firearm, rifle or shotgun 'hich
has been defaced for the purpose of concealment or prevention of the detection of
a crime or misrepresenting the identity of such machine-gun, firearm, rifle or
shotgun; or (4) He possesses any loadedfirearm. Such possession shall not. ex-
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a seven year maximum, to be enhanced to criminal possession of a
weapon in the second degree by the application of the statutory presumption.
As of 1977, the "intent to use" presumption, section 265.15(4), had
not been applied in a gun prosecution charging mere possession under
criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree so as to raise the
charge to criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree. 73 It appears that the first case to apply the section 265.15(4) presumption to
simple or mere possession of a firearm was People v. Evans.74 This case
involved a narcotics investigation in Suffolk County which included
members of the New York City Police Department and the use of a confidential informant. 75 Importantly, the confidential informant knew
about a contract that had been offered to kill one Rory Schonhaut. 7 6
When a Cadillac was seen in the vicinity of Schonhaut's house, officers
from the local police arrived to investigate and were directed to an
automobile driving past the house at that moment which fit the description.7 7 The responding officers gave chase and, in attempting to pass the
vehicle, noticed defendant driver's nervous behavior. 7 8 The vehicle was
stopped and searched. 79 The search revealed a loaded .44 caliber revolver found under the driver's seat, a loaded .38 caliber revolver, a pair
of handcuffs and eleven .44 caliber magnum bullets. 80 In addition, .44
cept as provided in subdivision one, constitute a violation of this section if such
possession takes place in such person'shome or place of business. (5)(i) He possesses twenty or more firearms; or (ii) he possesses a firearm and has been previously convicted of a felony or a class A misdemeanor defined in this chapter
within the five years immediately preceding the commission of the offense and
such possession did not take place in the person's home or place of business.
Criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree is a class D felony.
Id. (emphasis added).
73. See People v. Hassan, 57 A.D.2d 594, 393 N.Y.S.2d 606 (2d Dep't 1977)
(convicting defendant of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree without
an instruction as to section 265.15(4)).
74. 106 A.D.2d 527, 483 N.Y.S.2d 339 (2d Dep't 1984).
75. ld., 483 N.Y.S.2d at 341.
76. Id. Ironically, the informant was actually offered the contract. Id.
77. Id. at 528, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 342.
78. Id. at 529, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 342. "At that point, Officer Pepple looked over at
the driver of the vehicle, the defendant herein, and noticed that he was acting suspiciously." Id.
79. Id at 529, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 342-43.
80. Id. at 529-30, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 343. The initial observation of the interior revealed the loaded .44 caliber revolver found under the driver's seat. Id. Once the vehicle
had been impounded and brought to a precinct, the contents of the car were examined
and the rest of the items noted above were uncovered. Id.
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caliber rounds were found in the defendant's pants pockets during a
search at the precinct.81
Prior to trial, defendant's motion to suppress was denied. 8 2 The trial
court charged the jury that it could presume intent to use the guns unlawfully, pursuant to section 265.15(4), and convict the defendant of
criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree. 8 3 The jury convicted the defendant.8 4 On appeal, the Appellate Division, Second Department stated that the trial court's use of the section 265.15(4) presumption was proper:
The question of whether the defendant intended to use tie weapons unlawfully against another (Penal Law, § 265.03) was for the jury to decide
in view of the circumstances of the case. Moreover, the statutory presumption of intent (Penal Law, § 265.15, subd. 4) allowed the jury, if it
so desired, to infer such intent. 85
Notably, no case law was cited by the court nor was the legislative
history of the law discussed. Had the defendant been carrying drugs and
been prosecuted by the federal authorities, he clearly would have been
guilty of "carrying" weapons, but not "use" according to Judge Williams
of the D.C. Circuit.8 6 In sharp contrast to Judge Williams' position,
nearly every other federal court would have upheld Evans' conviction
for firearms use, even though he never fired, brandished or even touched
the guns in his Cadillac. 8 7
As Evans illustrates, the New York courts, by liberally applying the
statutory intent to use presumption (section 265.15(4)) originally meant
for non-per se misdemeanor weapons possession, have blurred the
"possession-use distinction." 88 In Evans, simple or mere possession of
firearms, a Class '" felony with a maximum sentence of seven years
incarceration, was converted or enhanced into criminal possession of a

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id at 530, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 343.
Id
Id at 532,483 N.Y.S.2d at 344-45.
Id at 532, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 345.
Id
See United States v. Bailey, 36 F.3d 106, 121-23 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Williams. J..

dissenting) (arguing that "carrying" a gun with drugs requires more to rise to the level of
"use").
87. Id at 120 (Williams, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, Judge Williams reminds the

majority that "[n]early all of our sister circuits say that mere possession of a firearm does
not constitute 'use' under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).' A brief discussion of the positions of the
circuit courts can be found in United States v. McFadden, 13 F.3d 463, 469-70 (lst Cir.
1994) (Breyer, C.L, dissenting).
88. See People v. Evans, 106 A.D.2d 527,483 N.Y.S.2d 339 (2d Dep't 1984).
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weapon in the second degree, a Class "C" felony with a maximum sen89
tence of fifteen years imprisonment.
Contrary to the Evans decision, the defendant should have only been
found to have been in simple or mere possession of the firearms which
were in his vehicle, but which were not fired, brandished, or drawn.
Nevertheless, a federally inspired metamorphosis of the defendant's
possession into use by charging the jury with New York's statutory presumption of intent to use,9 0 mirrored the federal courts' treatment of
similar cases involving the application of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). 9 1 Thus,
New York joined the federal courts in the dissolution of the
"possession-use distinction." It may be no coincidence that § 924(c)(1)
was passed by Congress in its present form in 1984, the same year Evans
92
was decided.
The trial court's use of the presumption in Evans, as approved by the
Second Department, was a clear judicial expansion of a presumption
heretofore applied only to misdemeanors. While the application of the
presumption was a judicial tour de force applied to a "bad" defendant, it
was also an unjustified encroachment on the intent of the New York
State legislature.
On the other hand, while the New York courts may have joined federal courts in kind, they have not joined them in degree. There are few
reported New York cases which have converted or enhanced by the presumption of intent to use mere simple possession of a firearm to the "C"
felony, criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree. 9 3
In praise of New York judicial and prosecutorial restraint, it must be
said that the courts and district attorneys have generally prosecuted those
cases charging criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree
where the defendant has fired the gun, shot someone, or at least brandished the firearm by word or deed. 9 4 Those are the paradigmatic uses
89. Id. See supra note 10.
90. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.15(4), supra note 60.
91. See supra notes 5 and 32 and accompanying text.
92. See supra notes 5 and 74 for date verification.
93. See People v. Coluccio, 170 A.D.2d 523, 524, 566 N.Y.S.2d 87, 87-88 (2d
Dep't) (finding that intent can be inferred from situation where defendant confessed to
possessing a loaded gun to protect cocaine and money), appeal denied, 77 N.Y.2d 993,
575 N.E.2d 405, 571 N.Y.S.2d 919 (1991); In re John N., 168 A.D.2d 386, 387, 563
N.Y.S.2d 397, 399 (1st Dep't 1990) (stating that the lower court correctly applied the
statutory presumption of intent to use where a person possesses a weapon); People v.
Dumas, 156 Misc. 2d 1025, 595 N.Y.S.2d 644 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1992) (finding no
rational basis or independent proof to invoke § 265.15(4)).
94. See People v. Pons, 68 N.Y.2d 264, 267, 501 N.E.2d 11, 13, 508 N.Y.S.2d 403,
405 (1986) (holding that "because possession of a weapon does not involve the use of
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mentioned by Judge Ginsburg9 5 and advocated by Judge Williams. 9 6
However, New York prosecutors are willing to indict for criminal pos-

session of a weapon in the second degree, in mere possession circum-

97
stances, presumably as a plea bargaining tool.
People v. Dumas98 is a good example of a trial court's struggle - in a
difficult case - to avoid the strictures of the Evans decision. 99 Conse-

quently, no discussion of the presumption of intent, 100 as applied to
criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, would be complete without its discussion. Just as Justice Breyer was searching in
physical force, there are no circumstances when justification a1 can be a defense to the
crime of criminal possession of a weapon") (citation omitted); People v. Almodovar, 62
N.Y.2d 126, 128-30, 464 N.E.2d 463, 464-65, 476 N.Y.S.2d 95, 97 (1984) (finding
criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree where defendant fired several pistol shots claiming that he acted in self defense); People v. Bumbury, 194 A.D.2d 735,
735, 599 N.Y.S.2d 826, 827 (2d Dep't 1993) (finding that while defendant claimed he
fired gun in self defense, the charge of criminal possession in the second degree is affirmed because the charge is based on possession with intent to use rather than use of a
firearm); People v. Wooten, 149 A.D.2d 751, 751, 540 N.Y.S.2d 533, 534 (2d Dep't
1989) (holding that the "charge of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree
is based upon the defendant's possession of the loaded firearm, not its lawful use in selfdefense"); People v. Carrion, 136 A.D.2d 649, 650, 523 N.Y.S.2d 606, 607 (2d Dep't)
(finding charge of criminal possession in second degree based on possession, not its use),
appeal denied, 71 N.Y.2d 967, 524 N.E.2d 432, 529 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1988); People v.
Lewis, 116 A.D.2d 16, 20, 499 N.Y.S.2d 709, 711-12 (Ist Dep't 1986) (reversing conviction for criminal possession in the second degree where defendant displayed the handle of the gun with a reasonable basis for self-defense and raised factual issues as to his
intent to use the gun unlawfully). The reasoning in People v. Pons prohibiting application of the defense of justification to criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (intent to use unlawfully against another) is strained and unreasonable. Justification
is a defense to "intent" crimes. Because criminal possession of a v eapon in the second
degree is clearly an "intent" crime, it should be subject to that defense.
95. United States v. Bailey, 36 F.3d 106, 114 (D.C. Cir. 1994). In Bailey, the D.C.
Circuit determined that restricting the definition of -use" to the paradigmatic level "firing, brandishing, or displaying the gun during the commission of the predicate offense" - was, while virtuous in its simplicity, too narrow to include the manifold kinds of
"use" which Congress seemingly intended to address via § 924(c). Id.
96. Id at 121-22 (Williams, J., dissenting) (asserting that the language and background of § 924(c) suggests that an active definition of "use" was intended rather than
the majority's adoption of a less restrictive, more encompassing interpretation).
97. Cf. People v. Dumas, 156 Misc. 2d 1025, 1025-26, 595 N.Y.S.2d 644. 645
(Sup. Ct. Kings County 1992) (agreeing that "'bootstrapping' of one presumption onto
another presumption, in a vacuum," without any rational evidence pertaining to intent
demands dismissal of all charges).
98. 156 Misc. 2d 1025, 595 N.Y.S.2d 644 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1992).
99. See People v. Evans, 106 A.D.2d 527, 483 N.Y.S.2d 339 (2d Dep't 1984): sitpra notes 74-92 and accompanying text.
100. See N.Y. PENAL LAWV § 265.15(4), supra note 60 and accompanying text.
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McFadden,10 1 Justice Miller, in Dumas, was looking for "something
more." 102 Although the result in Dumas differed, neither judge found
enough evidence of "use" to justify the statutory sentencing enhance3
ment. 10
In Dumas, defendant was the wife of a gentleman who was accidentally killed by the discharge of a pistol.1 0 4 Defendant, her husband,
and an individual named Douglas Williams were transporting pistols
from North Carolina to New York.105 At some point, defendant's husband requested Williams to display one of the guns. 106 When Williams
withdrew the gun from a duffel bag, it discharged, struck defendant's
husband in the back, and killed him. 10 7 Defendant alerted the police in a
futile attempt to save her husband's life. 10 8 The police, however, arrested defendant and Williams, and charged them with simple possession of a firearm, criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree.109
In addition, they were both charged with criminal possession of a
weapon in the second degree.1 10
Subsequently, the Dumas court dismissed the charge of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree against the defendant, holding
that the district attorney's instructions to the grand jury, both as to the
automobile presumption (section 265.15(3))11 together with the pre101. See United States v. McFadden, 13 F.3d 463, 469 (Ist Cir. 1994) (describing
the numerous steps which this defendant would have had to take in order to actually put
the gun to use).
102. See Dumas, 156 Misc. 2d at 1030, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 648. "[I1f there had been a
scintilla of evidence which might rationally support a charge that she intended to use the
weapons, this indictment would be sustained." Id. (citations omitted).
103. See United States v. McFadden, 13 F.3d at 469 (Breyer, C.J., dissenting); Dumas, 156 Misc. 2d at 1030, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 648.
104. Dumas, 156 Misc. 2d at 1026-27, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 645-46.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1027, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 646.
109. Id.
110. Id. The defendants were also charged with criminal sale of a firearm in the second degree. Id.
111. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.15(3) (McKinney 1995). Section 265.15(3) provides:
The presence in an automobile, other than a stolen one or a public omnibus, of
any firearm, defaced firearm, defaced rifle or shotgun, firearm silencer, explosive
or incendiary bomb, bombshell, gravity knife, switchblade knife, pilum ballistic
knife, dagger, dirk, stiletto, billy, blackjack, metal knuckles, chuka stick, sandbag, sandclub or slungshot is presumptive evidence of its possession by all persons occupying such automobile at the time such weapon, instrument or appliance is found, except under the following circumstances: (a) if such weapon, instrument or appliance is found upon the person of one of the occupants therein;
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sumption of intent to use unlawfully (section 265.15(4)), were improper.1 12 What the Dumas court failed to suggest was that based upon a

theory of acting in concert pursuant to Penal Law Section 20.00,113 the
defendant could have been prosecuted without resorting to the automo-

bile presumption, thereby curing the defect in the district attorney's instructions to the grand jury. 114
Nevertheless, the Dumas court held
that the finding that the defendant intended to use the weapons unlawfully against another did not flow naturally, logically or rationally from
any proven facts, but was based entirely upon the impermissible
"bootstrapping" of presumptions. If the defendant had been the actual
shooter or if she had physically possessed the weapons, a different result
might ensue.1

15

The court then cited People v. Evans and stated that if there had been
any evidence that the defendant intended to use the weapons, the result
would have been different.1 1 6 In referring to Evans, the Dumas court

failed to note that there was not one iota of evidence in Evans that the
defendant intended to use the weapons in the classic and paradigmatic
sense.

1 17

The Dumas court further held that "[h]ere the 'intent' charges were

proffered merely because defendant was present in the automobile, in
which the weapons were found. This, alone, was insufficient."ll8 In

view of Evans, the Dumas court was in error on this point. Pursuant to
(b) if such weapon, instrument or appliance is found in an automobile which is
being operated for hire by a duly licensed driver in the due, lawful and proper
pursuit of his trade, then such presumption shall not apply to the driver;, or (c) if
the weapon so found is a pistol or revolver and one of the occubants, not present
under duress, has in his possession a valid license to have and cany concealed the
same.
Id
112. Dumas, 156 Misc. 2d at 1029-30, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 647. See supra note 60 and
accompanying text.
113. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 20.00 (McKinney 1995). Section 20.00 provides:
When one person engages in conduct which constitutes an offense, another person is criminally liable for such conduct when, acting with the mental culpability
required for the commission thereof, he solicits, requests, commands, importunes.
or intentionally aids such person to engage in such conduct.
Rd
114. Dumas, 156 Misc. 2d at 1029, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 647.
115. Id at 1029-30, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 647 (citations omitted).
116. Id at 1030, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 648 (citing People v. Evans, 106 A.D.2d 527. 483
N.Y.S.2d 339).
117. See People v. Evans, 106 A.D.2d 527, 483 N.Y.S.2d 339.
118. Dumas, 156 Misc. 2d at 1030, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 648.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1995

17

Touro Law Review, Vol. 12, No. 1 [1995], Art. 4

TOURO LA WREVIEW

[Vol 12

Evans, the prosecution in Dumas could have charged the defendant with
criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree via an acting in
concert instruction, 1 19 and the statutory presumption of intentl 20 to use
a firearm unlawfully. 12 1 In this regard, the Dumas court frankly stated
that defendant "appears to have knowingly participated in their transport
[referring to the guns] from North Carolina to Brooklyn." 12 2 In light of
Dumas, it should be noted that the automobile presumption12 3 was
probably charged by the trial court in Evans, but not objected to nor
made an issue on appeal.
To the credit of the District Attorney of Kings County, no presentation
was made to a second grand jury in Dumas. One assumes that the prosecution was satisfied with defendant's admission of guilt to criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree and criminal sale of a firearm. 12 4
CONCLUSION

Judge Ginsburg commented upon the "widely divergent and seemingly contradictory results" in the D.C. Circuit regarding the
"possession-use distinction" or lack thereof. 12 5 Obviously, the incongruity is not found solely in the federal courts. 12 6 New York has also
suffered, though with much less frequency, from divergent and contradictory results caused by the judicial effort to legislate the end of the
possession-use distinction. Any such endeavor unquestionably belongs
in the hands of Congress and the New York State legislature. Still, it
remains apparent that both the federal and New York judicial systems
have blurred, and in some cases virtually eliminated, the distinction between use and possession of a firearm. What the future holds in this area
will, of course, depend on the Supreme Court's decision in Robinson
#2.127 It is my hope that the Supreme Court's review will expose the
issue, and end the confusion on the federal level, while simultaneously
provoking a rethinking in New York.

119. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 20.00, supra note 113.
120. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.15(4), supra note 60.
121. See Evans, 106 A.D.2d at 532, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 344-45.
122. 156 Misc. 2d at 1030, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 648.
123. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.15(3), supra note 111.
124. See supra notes 109-110 and accompanying text.
125. See United States v. Bailey, 36 F.3d 106, 111 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. granted,
115 S. Ct. 1689 (1995).
126. See People v. Evans, 106 A.D.2d 527, 483 N.Y.S.2d 339.
127. See supra note 125 for full citation.
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Finally, United States Supreme Court students should have no difficulty prophesying that the key to the court's ruling in Robinson #2 lies
somewhere in the zone between Smith 12 8 and Justice Breyer's dissent in
McFadden.12 9 Robinson #2 may be the neutral ground where the socalled liberal and conservative wings of the court meet and construe
§ 924(c) "use" in the classic paradigmatic sense that Congress probably
intended.

128. United States v. Smith, 113 S. Ct. 2050 (1993). See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
129. United States v. McFadden, 13 F.3d 463, 466-70 (Ist Cir. 1994) (Breyer, C.J..
dissenting). See supra notes 32-41 and accompanying text.
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